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General Law of Contracts and Obligations
– Trade mark owner withdrawing consent to use trade mark: Judgment in
Case 661/11 Martin Y Paz Diffusion 19.09.2013 (CJEU): In the case at hand,
both parties are active in the industry of leather fashion items and have used
the same trade mark, but each with respect to different goods. The parties
initially cooperated and changed the trade mark they used over time. Despite
the fact that one of the parties registered some of those trade marks, they
continued their relationship as before. Later, the relationship of the parties
deteriorated, resulting in several legal proceedings. The question arose
whether the owner of a trade mark can be permanently prevented from
exercising its exclusive rights and from using the trade mark for certain goods
because a third party has used the mark for these goods with the consent of
the owner over an extended period of time. The CJEU held that Article 5 of
Directive 89/104/EEC1 precludes a proprietor of trade marks which, in a
situation where there has been use shared with a third party, but no longer
consents to that use, from being deprived of any possibility of asserting the
1 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member
States relating to trademarks,OJ 1989 L40/1.
DOI 10.1515/ercl-2014-0005 ERCL 2014; 10(1): 124–166
exclusive right conferred upon it by those marks against that third party and
of itself exercising that exclusive right in respect of goods which are identical
to those of that third party.
– Derogation of the obligation to install recording equipment in respect of the
non-commercial carriage of goods: Judgment in case 317/12 Lundberg
03.10.2013(CJEU): The CJEU held that the concept of ‘non-commercial car-
riage of goods’ in Article 3(h) of Regulation No 561/20062 must be interpreted
as covering the carriage of goods by a private individual for his own purposes
purely as part of his hobby where that hobby is in part financed by financial
contributions from external persons or undertakings and where no payment
is made for that carriage per se. In the case at hand, Mr Lundberg, a Swedish
national and amateur rally driver, was taking his rally car to a fair by using
an extra lorry attached to his normal car when the police stopped him and
issued a fine for not having a tachograp. The purpose of the derogation in
Article 3(h) is to exclude from the scope of the regulation the carriage of
goods by private individuals outside any professional or commercial activity.
Since the type of carriage of goods at issue appears to be relatively infrequent,
an interpretation of the derogation at issue to the effect that it covers the
carriage of goods carried out by a private individual as part of his hobby
ought not to have significant negative effects on road safety.
– Remuneration to authors for the communication of their works by means of
television or radio receivers to patients in bedrooms in a spa establishment:
Opinion in case 351/12 OSA 14.11.2013 (CJEU): According to Advocate-General
Sharpston, the national law exception disallowing remuneration to authors
for the communication of their works by means of television or radio receivers
to patients in rooms in a spa establishment which is a business is contrary to
Directive 2001/29/EC.3 The Advocate-General distinguished the situation at
hand from SCF,4 where the CJEU held that the criteria for ascertaining
whether there is ‘communication to the public’ were not met where back-
ground music was broadcast in the presence of patients at a private dental
clinic. However, none of those considerations apply in case of spa establish-
2 Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006
on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council
Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC)
No 3820/85,OJ 2006 L102/1.
3 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ
2001 L167/10.
4 Case 135/10 Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) vMarco Del Corso 15.3.2012 (CJEU).
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ments, which typically have a broader and less determinate clientele than
dentists. The availability of access to television and radio broadcasts in bed-
rooms may well influence a patient’s choice of establishment. Moreover, the
television and radio sets are in residents’ bedrooms and are used in the
context of enjoyment of the accommodation facilities offered by the spa, not
of its health care treatment. Such a situation would be analogous to that of
the hotel guests in SGAE.5
– Responsibilities of digital service providers towards copyright holders: Opi-
nion in case 314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien 26.11.2013 (CJEU): The case at hand
concerns the access to a website on which more than 130,000 movies were
made available for streaming and downloading without permission of the
copyright holders. The question is whether the internet provider, who had no
(contractual) relation to the makers of the website, was under a legal duty to
prohibit users from accessing the website. Advocate General Cruz Villalón
held that to impose a general prohibition on an internet provider to allow its
users to view a website that violates copyright law, without giving any
specific guidance as to concrete measures that should be taken so as to
prevent access to the site, is incompatible with Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/
29/EC.6 This is not different in case where a provider may avoid sanctions by
demonstrating to have taken all reasonable measures to uphold the prohibi-
tion. However, a national measure specifically requiring a certain provider to
block access to a designated website is not as a matter of principle dispropor-
tionate for the sole fact that it requires the service provider to incur consider-
able costs, while users may easily circumvent the technical measures taken
by the service provider.
– Mandatory information requirements for a prospectus when securities are
offered to the public: Opinion in case 359/12 Timmel 26.11.2013 (CJEU): In the
case at hand, Mr Timmel subscribed for Dragon FX Grant securities, for which
certain required information was omitted from the base prospectus and from
a supplement to it. The relevant documents could only be found and retrieved
for a while on the homepage of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, following a
lengthy and complicated registration process, upon which only two docu-
ments per month could be consulted free of charge. Therefore Mr Timmel
launched legal proceedings, arguing that the prospectus had not been validly
5 Case 306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA
[2006] ECR I-11519 (CJEU).
6 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ
2001 L167/10.
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published and that he was therefore entitled to withdraw from the contract to
purchase the securities in question. The referring court seeks guidance on the
interpretation of Regulation No 809/2004,7 particularly it is questionable
when an issuer of securities offered to the public must publish a supplement
to a base prospectus, and what constitutes valid publication of a base
prospectus in electronic form. Advocate-General Sharpston considers that
according to Article 22 of the Regulation, the supplement to the prospectus is
having a function of correcting any material mistakes or inaccuracies as well
as revealing significant new factors. If the required information became
known to the issuer after the prospectus has been published but would not
materially influence the assessment of securities, it does not have to be
revealed in the supplement but may be added to the final terms instead.
However, Article 29 of the Regulation requires that the base prospectus
should be easily accessible to an investor when entering the website, and
additionally, must be made available at the registered office of the issuer and
at the offices of the financial intermediaries.
– Conditions for the outsourcing of responsibilities of producer organisations
under Regulation No 2200/96:8 Judgment in case 500/11 Fruition Po
19.12.2013 (CJEU): The dispute at hand concerns the decision of the UK
Minister for Sustainable Farming and Food and Animal Health to withdraw
the recognition of Fruition’s status as producer organisation granted to it on
the basis of Regulation No 2200/96 on the grounds that the functions which
ought to have been its responsibility had been almost entirely outsourced
and, further, that Fruition had not supplied sufficient evidence that it exer-
cised control over these outsourced functions. The CJEU held that a producer
organization, which has entrusted to a third party the carrying out of the
activities which are essential to its recognition under Article 11 of Regulation
No 2200/96, can meet the conditions for recognition laid down therein, if it
enters into a contractual agreement enabling it to continue to be responsible
for the carrying out of those activities and for control of their overall manage-
ment, in such a way that that organisation retains, ultimately, the power of
control and, when necessary, the power to take timely action as regards those
activities being carried out for the entire duration of the agreement. It is for
7 Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses
as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and
dissemination of advertisements,OJ 2004 L149/1.
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organization of the
market in fruit and vegetables,OJ 1996 L297/1.
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the national court to determine in each case whether the degree of control
retained by a producer organisation fulfils this requirement.
– Liability of a public limited liability company in case of inaccurate informa-
tion in the share prospectus: Judgment in case 174/12 Hirmann 19.12.2013
(CJEU): In the case at hand, an investor purchased shares in a public limited
liability company on the secondary market through a broker and subse-
quently contended that the information in the securities prospectus on which
he relied in making the purchase was neither complete nor truthful. The
investor claimed that the national court should cancel the contract for the
purchase of the shares and award damages. According to Austrian law, a
public liability company, which breaches its information obligations stem-
ming from the Prospectus Directive,9 Transparency Directive10 and Market
Abuse Directive,11 is required to re-acquire its shares and refund the purchase
price to the investor. The CJEU held that the national legislation does not run
counter to the objectives of the Second Company Law Directive12 to ensure
that the share capital of public limited liability companies is maintained and
that the shareholders are treated equally. In this regard, the Second Company
Law Directive regulates the legal relationships established between the com-
pany and its shareholders, which derive exclusively from the memorandum
and articles of association and are directed solely to the internal relations
within the company concerned. On the other hand, the source of liability at
issue is the share purchase contract. The legal obligation of the company to
compensate the investor who has suffered loss is wholly unrelated to the
provisions of the Second Company Directive for the maintenance of capital.
Moreover, shareholders who have suffered loss as a result of a company’s
wrongful conduct occurring prior or at the time of the purchase of the shares
9 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and
amending Directive 2001/34/EC,OJ 2003 L345/64.
10 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on
the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, OJ
2004 L390/38.
11 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on
insider dealing andmarketmanipulation (market abuse),OJ 2003 L96/16.
12 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of
companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of
the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their
capital, with a view tomaking such safeguards equivalent,OJ 1977 L026/1.
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are not in a situation which is identical to that of shareholders in the same
company whose legal situation has not been affected by that wrongful
conduct. The CJEU stressed that while the establishment of such a civil
liability regime falls within the discretion of the Member States, it consti-
tutes an appropriate remedy for the harm suffered by the investor and for
the failure of the issuing company to comply with the information require-
ments under the Prospectus Directive, Transparency Directive and Market
Abuse Directive. Accordingly, the Member States are also free to decide
whether to base the calculation of the sum to be refunded on the value of
the shares when the claim was brought or on the original purchase price.
The CJEU clarified that the national liability regime is wholly unrelated to
company nullity procedures as provided for in Articles 12 and 13 of Directive
2009/101.13 Additionally, where the harm to the purchaser is caused solely
by the irregular conduct of the issuing company, there is no justification for
having recourse to the test of a satisfactory balance and a fair division of
the risks among the various interested parties, as referred to in the judgment
E. Friz.14
Consumer Protection
Advertising
– Criteria to determine a misleading commercial practice: Judgment in case
435/11 CHS Tour Services 19.09.2013 (CJEU): The CJEU clarified that if a com-
mercial practice satisfies all the criteria specified in Article 6(1) of the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive15 for being categorised as a misleading prac-
tice, it is not necessary to determine whether such a practice is also contrary
to the requirements of professional diligence in Article 5(2)(a) in order for it to
be regarded as unfair and, therefore, prohibited in accordance with Ar-
13 Directive 2009/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on
coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and third parties,
are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of
Article 48 of the Treaty, with a view tomaking such safeguards equivalent,OJ 2009 L258/11.
14 Case 215/08 E. Friz GmbH v Carsten von der Heyden [2010] ECR I-02947 (CJEU).
15 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concern-
ing unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending
Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and
of the Council,OJ 2005 L149/22.
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ticle 5(1). CHS and Team4 Travel are two Austrian companies that operate
travel agencies organising skiing courses and winter holidays in Austria for
groups of schoolchildren from the UK. CHS was of the opinion that the
exclusivity statement contained in the sales brochure for the 2012 winter
season of Team4 Travel infringes the prohibition of unfair commercial prac-
tices. It consequently asked the Austrian courts to prohibit Team4 Travel from
stating that, on specific dates, certain hotels can be booked only through
Team4 Travel, because those hotels can also be booked through CHS. Team4
Travel argued that it acted with the professional diligence required in the
light of the pre-booking contracts concluded with the hotels and that it had
not been aware of the contracts concluded between CHS and those hotels.
According to the general scheme of the Directive, Article 5(4) categorises
commercial practices as unfair where it is established that they are mislead-
ing as set out in Articles 6 and 7 or aggressive as set out in Articles 8 and 9,
showing that the determination of whether the practice concerned is mislead-
ing or aggressive depends only on the assessment of the practice in the light
of the criteria set out in those latter articles alone. As a consequence and in
line with a high level of consumer protection, for the purpose of applying
Article 6(1), the national court is not required to determine whether the
commercial practice is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence
under Article 5(2)(a). This interpretation was shared by the opinion of Advo-
cate-General Wahl, delivered on 13 June 2013.
– Misleading statements made by a sickness insurance fund, being a public
body: Judgment in case 59/12 BKK Mobil Oil 03.10.2013 (CJEU): The CJEU
followed the conclusion reached by Advocate-General Bot (delivered on
4 July 2013) and held that a public law body charged with a task of public
interest falls within the persons covered by the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive. The dispute at hand arose between BKK Mobil Oil, a public law
body providing statutory health insurance, and the German Office for the
Prevention of Unfair Competition regarding misleading advertising circulated
by BKK to its members. The CJEU pointed out that the meaning and scope of
the concept of ‘trader’ which is used in the directive must be determined in
relation to the related but diametrically opposed concept of ‘consumer’,
which refers to any individual not engaged in commercial or trade activities.
BKK’s members, who must manifestly be regarded as consumers within the
meaning of the directive, could be deceived by the misleading information
circulated by that body, thus preventing them from making an informed
choice and leading them to take a decision they would not have taken in the
absence of such information. In order to give full effect to the Unfair Commer-
cial Practices Directive and in accordance with a high level of consumer
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protection, it is irrelevant in those circumstances, whether the body or the
specific tasks pursued are of a public or private nature.
– Publication of misleading advertorials: Judgment in case 391/12 RLvS
17.10.2013 (CJEU): The case concerned the Law governing the Press of the
Land of Baden-Württemberg (Germany) according to which any publication
for remuneration is prohibited, irrespective of the purpose thereby pursued,
if that publication is not identified by the use of the term ‘advertisement’,
unless it is already evident from the arrangement and layout of the publica-
tion that it is an advertisement. The national provision seeks to prevent
newspaper readers from being misled by advertising which is disguised as
editorial content and to maintain the objectivity and neutrality of the press.
The CJEU held that the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, particularly
point 11 of Annex I thereto, is not intended to protect a competitor of a
newspaper publisher on the ground that the latter proceeded with publica-
tions which are liable to promote the products or services of advertisers
sponsoring those publications, without the identification as ‘advertising’.
The practices covered by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive must be
commercial in nature, i.e. that they must originate from traders and must be
directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of their products to
consumers. However, the publications in dispute, namely two articles with
informative and descriptive editorial content, are not such as to promote the
newspaper publisher’s product, in this case a free newspaper, but rather the
products and services of undertakings which are not parties to the dispute.
The situation would be different if the newspaper publisher would act in the
name of or on behalf of those undertakings sponsoring the publications
within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Direc-
tive. Moreover, while the EU legislator has imposed through the Directives
89/55216 and 2010/13/EU17 obligations in the audiovisual field on media
providers when their audiovisual services or programmes are sponsored by
third-party undertakings, this is not the case for the written press. Conse-
quently, the Member States retain the power to impose obligations on news-
paper publishers to indicate when editorial content has been sponsored. The
CJEU did not follow the opinion of Advocate-General Wathelet, delivered on
16 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid
down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of
television broadcasting activities,OJ 1989 L298/23.
17 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services,OJ 2010 L95/1.
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11 July 2013, that the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive precludes more
restrictive national provisions regulating the publisher’s activity.
– Ratione temporis of Article 10 of Regulation No 1924/2006:18 Opinion in
case 609/12 Ehrmann 14.11.2013 (CJEU): Ehrmann produces milk products
and among others, a fruit quark, which was labelled with the slogan ‘As
important as the daily glass of milk’. The German Association for the Combat-
ting of Unfair Competition took legal action against Ehrmann as it considered
the slogan to be in breach with Articles 9 and 10 of Regulation No 1924/2006.
The referring court notes that according to the judgment of the CJEU in
Deutsches Weintor,19 the slogan constitutes a health claim under Article 2(2)(5)
of Regulation 1924/2006. Moreover, in the relevant time-period of the dis-
pute, ie in the year 2010, the labelling of the product did not comply with the
information requirements in Article 10(2). However, the national court was
unsure whether it was necessary to comply with Article 10(2) in 2010. Follow-
ing the Opinion of Advocate-General Wathelet, according to Article 28(5) of
Regulation No 1924/2006, it was necessary to comply with the duty to
provide information under Article 10(2) since 1 July 2007. According to
Article 28(5), health claims falling under Article 13(1)(a) of the Regulation
could be used from the entering into force of the Regulation until the adop-
tion of the list of permitted claims under Article 13(3), provided they comply
with the requirements of the Regulation, including Article 10(2). It remains to
be seen whether the CJEU will broaden the preliminary reference of the
national court in order to question whether the slogan constitutes a ‘health
claim’ in terms of the Regulation. In line with the view of the referring court,
Advocate-General Wathelet affirmed this question. It remains also open
whether the CJEU will address the question submitted by the Commission as
to whether Article 10(3) instead of Article 10(2) is applicable to the slogan.
– Application of Article 3(5) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive:
Opinion in case 421/12 Commission v Belgium 26.11.2013 (CJEU): The Commis-
sion brought infringement proceedings against Belgium for the incorrect
implementation of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. According to
Advocate-General Cruz Villalón, Belgium failed to comply with its obligation
on three grounds. Firstly, by excluding from the scope of the Belgian transpo-
sition members of a profession and dentists and physiotherapists, Belgium
has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3, combined with Article 2(b)
18 Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December
2006 on nutrition and health claimsmade on foods,OJ 2006 L404/9.
19 Case 544/10DeutschesWeintor eG v Land Rheinland-Pfalz 6.9.2012 (CJEU).
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and (d) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Secondly, by maintain-
ing in force stricter rules for the announcement of price reductions than
foreseen by the Directive, Belgium breached its obligation in Article 4, which
lays down the maximum harmonization nature of the Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive. As the Belgian provisions do not fall within the scope
of Price Indication Directive 98/6/EC,20 Belgium is precluded to rely on
Article 3(5) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which allows the
Member States to apply national provisions which are more restrictive and
which implement directives containing minimum harmonisation clauses.
Finally, Belgian failed to comply with Article 4 by adopting stricter provisions
for itinerant sales of certain products. While itinerate sales constitute com-
mercial practices under Article 2(d) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Direc-
tive, the Belgian provisions could also fall within the scope of the Doorstep
Selling Directive 85/577,21 which allows the Member States in Article 8 to
adopt more favourable provisions to protect consumers. However, as Belgium
did not notify the Commission about those national provisions in accordance
with Article 3(6), it cannot rely on Article 3(5) of the Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive.
– Criteria to determine a misleading commercial practice: Judgment in case
281/12 Trento Sviluppo and Centrale Adriatica 19.12.2013 (CJEU): The CJEU held
that a commercial practice cannot be classified as ‘misleading’ for the pur-
poses of Article 6(1) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive on the sole
ground that that practice contains false information, or is likely to deceive the
average consumer, but must also cause the consumer to take a transactional
decision that he would not have taken otherwise. In the dispute at hand,
upon complaint by a consumer, the Italian authority responsible for compli-
ance with competition and the rules of the market took legal action against
Trento Sviluppo and Centrale Adriatica. The consumer claimed that the
commercial announcement of the defendants was inaccurate because, when
he went to the supermarket during the validity period of the promotion, the IT
product, which was advertised at an attractive price, was not available. The
CJEU clarified that since the misleading commercial practices referred to in
Article 6(1) constitute a specific category of unfair commercial practices, they
must necessarily combine all the constituent elements of such unfairness,
20 Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 on
consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers,OJ 1998 L80/
27.
21 Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of
contracts negotiated away from business premises,OJ 1985 L372/31.
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including the element relating to the ability of the practice to materially
distort the economic behavior of the consumer by causing him to take a
transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. The scope of
the concept of ‘transactional decision’ is broadly defined under Article 2(k),
covering therefore not only the decision whether or not to purchase a
product, but also the decisions directly related to that decision, like acts
preparatory to the purchase of a product, such as the consumer’s trip to the
shop or the act of entering the shop.
– The concept of ‘consideration’ in pyramid schemes: Opinion in case 515/12
4finance 19.12.2013 (CJEU): The preliminary reference by the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court of Lithuania will give the CJEU the opportunity to address the
question what constitutes a pyramid scheme under the Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive. 4finance ran an advertising campaign indicating that
anyone registering on its website for a nominal registration fee would receive
a credit to his or her bank account for each ‘friend’ introduced by them (by
indicating on the on-line registration form that person’s mobile phone num-
ber or email address) who then registered on 4finance’s website. Providing
the contact information of the ‘friends’ enabled 4finance to market its small
loans to those persons who would subsequently be invited to register.
According to Advocate-General Sharpston, a pyramid scheme exists only
where consumers give consideration in order to enter such scheme. The
Directive is concerned with those practices that require consumers to give
consideration (ie to pay a fee) rather than situations where there is no such
economic commitment. In the absence of consideration, identifying the eco-
nomic behaviour of the consumer that requires protection under the Directive
would be uncertain. However, it is not required that the consumer pays a
certain minimum amount. In order to demonstrate that the operation at issue
constitutes a pyramid structure, there must be multiple levels with the opera-
tor at the apex and a cumulative recruitment of new members increasing
exponentially. The compensation paid to existing scheme members must be
derived primarily from the consideration given by new recruits.
Insurance
– Limitation of the right to compensation for non-material damage in the event
of road traffic accidents: Opinion in case 371/12 Petillo 09.10.2013 (CJEU): As
regards non-material damage in the event of car accidents leading to minor
physical injuries, Italian legislation provides for a compulsory method for
quantifying the compensation for damage to health payable by the civil
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liability insurer. On the basis of this legislation, Mr Petillo, who was the
victim of a road traffic accident, received from Unipol EUR 2,700 instead of
the requested EUR 14,155 for the non-material damage that he suffered. The
Italian court has doubts about the compatibility of the Italian legislation with
the obligation to compensate any loss or injury as provided for by Directive
72/166/EEC,22 Directive 84/5/EEC23 and Directive 90/232/EEC.24 According to
the case-law of the CJEU, while EU legislation guarantees the obligation to
provide insurance coverage against civil liability for damage caused by motor
vehicles, the extent of compensation to be afforded to the victims is a matter
essentially governed by national law.25 Advocate-General Wahl took the view
that the Italian legislation is not incompatible with Article 3(1) of Directive 72/
166/EEC for two reasons. Firstly, it does not exclude in total compensation for
non-material damage caused by car accidents. Secondly, the insurance cover
mirrors the relevant civil liability obligations with the result that the injured
party cannot seek additional compensation directly from the policy-holder
(the driver or car-owner) on the basis of other national provisions. Moreover,
the Italian legislation does not deprive the Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC
and 90/232/EEC of their effectiveness by limiting the right of the victim to be
compensated in a disproportionate manner, ie that the compensation for
non-material damage would be inadequate.
– Authority of the claims representative to accept service of judicial documents:
Judgment in case 306/12 Spedition Welter 10.10.2013 (CJEU): In order to obtain
compensation for the damage caused in a motor vehicle accident in France,
Spedition Welter GmbH initiated legal proceedings against the driver of the
other vehicle, insured by Avanssur SA, before the German courts. Notice of
those proceedings was not served on Avanssur, but on its designated repre-
22 Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member
States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability,OJ 1972 L103/1.
23 Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of
the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor
vehicles,OJ 1984 L008/17.
24 Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles,
OJ 1990 L129/33.
25 Case 300/10 Vítor Hugo Marques Almeida v Companhia de Seguros Fidelidade-Mundial SA and
Others 23.10.2012 (CJEU), paragraph 28; case 484/09, Manuel Carvalho Ferreira Santos v Compan-
hia Europeia de Seguiossa [2011] I-1821 (CJEU) paragraph 31; case 409/09 José Maria Ambrósio
Lavrador andMaria Cândida Olival Ferreira Bonifácio v Companhia de Seguros Fidelidade-Mundial
SA [2011] ECR I-04955, paragraph 25.
European Union Litigation 135
sentative in Germany. The admissibility of the legal action against Avanssur
depends on whether the claims representative was authorised to accept
service of judicial documents on behalf of the defendant. The CJEU clarified
that the purpose of Directive 2009/103/EC26 is to guarantee victims of motor
vehicle accidents comparable treatment irrespective of where in the Commu-
nity the accidents occur. As noted by Advocate-General Cruz Villalón in his
opinion of 30 May 2013, the specific purpose of the claims representative is to
make the steps to be taken by the victims easier, in particular by allowing
them to make a claim in their own language. Consequently, the CJEU held
that under Article 21(5) of Directive 2009/103/EC, the powers of the claims
representative must include the authority validly to accept service of legal
documents necessary for proceedings for settlement of a claim to be brought
before the court having jurisdiction. Considering that the German legislation
reproduces Article 21(5) of Directive 2009/103 word for word, the national
court is not required to disapply the national provision, but to interpret the
national law in a way to ensure that the claims representative is authorised to
accept service of judicial documents.
– Compensation for non-material damage suffered by the next of kin of the
deceased victim of a road traffic accident: Judgment in case 22/12 Haasová
24.10.2013 (CJEU): The case concerned the claim for compensation by Mrs
Haasová, acting in her own name and on behalf of her daughter, for the non-
material damage resulting from the death of her husband and father of her
child in a road traffic accident. The CJEU held that according to Article 3(1) of
Directive 72/166/EEC, Article 1(1) and (2) of Directive 84/5/EEC and Article 1(1)
of Directive 90/232/EEC, compulsory insurance must cover compensation for
non-material damage by the next of kin of the deceased victims of a road
traffic accident, in so far as such compensation is provided for as part of the
civil liability of the insured party under the national law. In order to reach
that conclusion, the CJEU adopted a broad interpretation of the notion of
‘personal injuries’ as covering any type of damage resulting from an injury to
physical integrity, which includes both physical and psychological suffer-
ing.27 Therefore, in line with the aim to strengthen the protection afforded to
victims, non-material damage features among the types of damage in respect
of which compensation must be provided. Moreover, it cannot be concluded
26 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability,OJ 2009 L263/11.
27 The CJEU relied in that regard on the judgment of the EFTA Court of 20 June 2008 in case E-8/
07 Celina Nguyen v The Norwegian State (EFTA Court report, 224, paragraphs 26 and 27).
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from any of the three directives that the European legislature intended to
limit their protection exclusively to persons directly involved in the road
traffic accident. The fact that, in the case at hand, the wife and the child of
the victim are entitled to compensation for non-material damage under the
sections of the national civil code governing injury to the rights of the person
but not under the section governing actual civil liability is irrelevant. It is
sufficient that the liability of the insured person originated in a road traffic
accident and is civil in nature to fall under the substantive national civil
liability law to which the directives refer.
– Limit to the amount of compensation for non-material damage covered by
compulsory insurance: Judgment in case 277/12 Drozdovs 24.10.2013 (CJEU):
The case concerned the claim of the guardian of a child for compensation on
the basis of the psychological suffering the child endured following the loss
of his parents in a road traffic accident. The amount claimed by the applicant
exceeded the maximum amount for non-material damage covered, under
Latvian law, by compulsory insurance. The CJEU held that Article 3(1) of
Directive 72/166/EEC and Article 1(1) and (2) of Directive 84/5/EEC preclude
national provisions, which limit compensation for non-material damage re-
sulting from the death of a person‘s next of kin in a road traffic accident
covered by the compulsory insurance to a maximum amount which is lower
than the minimum amounts laid down in Article 1(2) of Directive 84/5. In
contrast to the case Marques Almeida,28 the national legislation at hand did
not seek to determine the extent of the right of the victim to compensation
arising from the civil liability of the insured person, but limited the compul-
sory insurance cover of the insured person against civil liability.
– Freedom of the insured to choose a lawyer under a legal expenses insurance
contract: Judgment in case 442/12 Sneller 07.11.2013 (CJEU): The case con-
cerns a legal expenses insurance contract, which provides that legal assis-
tance will in principle be provided by the insurer’s own employees and that
the insured person has the right to instruct a lawyer or legal representative of
his own choosing only if the insurer takes the view that the handling of the
case must be subcontracted to an external lawyer. However, in legal proceed-
ings against his former employer, Mr Sneller wanted to be assisted by a
lawyer of his choosing and to have the costs of legal assistance covered by his
legal expenses insurer. Following the insurer’s refusal to cover those costs of
legal assistance, Mr Sneller took legal action to order the insurer to bear them.
28 Case 300/10 Vítor Hugo Marques Almeida v Companhia de Seguros Fidelidade-Mundial SA and
Others 23.10.2012 (CJEU).
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By relying on its ruling in Eschig29 and Stark,30 the CJEU held that according to
Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 87/344/EEC,31 the insured person’s right to choose
his lawyer cannot be restricted to situations in which the insurer decides that
recourse should be had to an external lawyer. This outcome does not differ
depending on whether or not legal assistance is compulsory under national
law in the type of legal proceedings concerned. However, the insured per-
son’s right to choose his representative does not rule out the possibility that,
in certain cases, limitations may be imposed on the costs to be borne by the
insurer, on condition that the freedom of choice is not rendered meaningless.
– Cancellation period of a life assurance contract: Judgment in case 209/12
Endress 19.12.2013 (CJEU): Upon termination of his life assurance contract,
Mr Endress received from his insurer the repayment value which was less
than the sums of the paid premiums with interest. Before court, Mr Endress
claimed that the contract was not validly concluded as he was not informed
of his right of cancellation and asked the insurer to repay all the premiums
plus interest. However, according to the national provisions at that time, the
right of the policy-holder to cancel the contract lapses one year after the
payment of the first premium. The CJEU concluded that in order to enable
the consumer to profit fully from the diversity and increased competition in a
single assurance market, Article 15(1) of Directive 90/619/EEC32 read in
conjunction with Article 31 of Directive 92/96/EEC33 precludes a national
provision, under which a right of cancellation lapses one year after payment
of the first premium, where the policy-holder has not been informed about
the right of cancellation. By applying its reasoning in Heininger34 to the
dispute at hand, the CJEU clarified that the insurer may not validly rely on
reasons of legal certainty in order to redress a situation caused by its own
29 Case 199/08 Erhard Eschig vUNIQA Sachversicherung AG [2009] ECR I-08295 (CJEU).
30 Case 293/10 Gebhard Stark v D.A.S. Österreichische Allgemeine Rechtsschutzversicherung AG
[2011] ECR I-04711 (CJEU).
31 Council Directive 87/344/EEC of 22 June 1987 on the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to legal expenses insurance,OJ 1987 L185/77.
32 Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations
and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate
the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC, OJ 1990
L330/50.
33 Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations
and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/
EEC and 90/619/EEC,OJ 1992 L360/1.
34 Case 481/99 Georg Heininger and Helga Heininger v Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG
[2001] ECR I-09945 (CJEU), paragraphs 45 and 47.
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failure to comply with the requirement, under European Union law, to com-
municate a defined list of information, including information relating to the
right of the policy-holder to cancel the contract. The CJEU refused to limit the
temporal effects of the judgment as the insurer failed to prove that there is a
risk of serious economic repercussions, nor has there been ‘objective, signifi-
cant uncertainty’ regarding the implications of the EU provisions.
Passenger rights and package holidays
– Compensation for rail passengers in the event of delays caused by force
majeure: Judgment in case 509/11 ÖBB-Personenverkehr 26.09.2013 (CJEU):
The Austrian Rail Network Control Commission regarded the terms of ticket
price compensation which ÖBB-Personenverkehr applied to passenger trans-
port contracts as not complying with Article 17 of Regulation No 1371/200735
and, consequently, ordered that undertaking to amend them. ÖBB-Personen-
verkehr claimed before court that it is excused from compensating the ticket
price when a delay is caused by force majeure. Particularly, on the basis of
Article 15 of the regulation, ÖBB-Personenverkehr submitted that the exemp-
tions from liability laid down in Article 32(2) of the CIV Uniform Rules36 are
applicable in the context of the regulation. In line with the opinion of
Advocate-General Jääskinen delivered on 14 March 2013, the CJEU held that a
railway undertaking may not exclude its obligation to pay compensation of
the ticket price in the event of a delay caused by force majeure or by one of
the reasons set out at Article 32(2) of the CIV Uniform Rules. Regulation No
1371/2007 makes no reference to force majeure or any circumstances that are
equivalent to it. Moreover, the compensation system provided for by the EU
legislature in Article 17 of Regulation No 1371/2007 cannot be treated in the
same way as the railway carrier’s liability system under Article 32 of the CIV
Uniform Rules. The purpose of the Regulation No 1371/2007 is to compensate
the passenger for the consideration provided for a service which was not
ultimately supplied in accordance with the transport contract. The compensa-
tion is calculated on the basis of a fixed rate of the ticket-price, which
35 Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October
2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations,OJ 2007 L315/14.
36 Appendix A – Uniform rules concerning the Contract for International Carriage of Passengers
and Luggage by Rail (CIV) to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) of
9 May 1980, as modified by the Protocol for the modification of the Convention concerning
International Carriage by Rail of 3 June 1999 (1999 Protocol).
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depends on the length of the delay. On the other hand, Article 32(1) of the CIV
Uniform Rules provides for compensation on the basis of an individual
assessment of the damage suffered, which can be claimed in addition to the
compensation under Regulation No 1371/2007. However, even though the
Austrian Rail Network Control Commission has only limited enforcement
powers under national law, Article 30(1) of Regulation No 1371/2007 cannot
be interpreted as constituting a legal basis authorising national bodies to
impose on railway undertakings the specific content of their contractual
terms relating to the circumstances in which they have to pay compensation.
Unfair contract terms
– Out-of-court settlement procedure of a secured claim by recourse to the
public auction of immovable property: Opinion in case 482/12 Macinský und
Macinská 21.11.2013 (CJEU): The case concerned the Slovak rules, which
enable a creditor to enforce a secured claim based on an unfair term in a
consumer contract through the sale of immovable property by means of an
out-of-court procedure. Advocate-General Wahl concluded that the Slovak
procedural and remedial system complies with Directive 93/13/EEC:37 The
consumer has the possibility to challenge the sale by public auction ex ante
and ex post before the national courts, triggering the case-law of the CJEU on
the responsibilities of the national court to assess of its own motion whether
a term is unfair and to ensure that the consumer is not bound by an unfair
term. He did not consider it to be an excessive impediment to the effective
legal protection of consumers to require the consumers to become themselves
active by initiating legal proceedings against the trader. Considering that
Advocate-General Wahl denied the admissibility of the preliminary question,
it remains to be seen whether the CJEU will engage into the substantive
assessment of the question referred by the Slovak court.
– Territorial jurisdiction in case of an action for an injunction: Judgment in
case 413/12 Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y León
05.12.2013 (CJEU): The case concerned the question whether EU law precludes
national procedural rules under which an action for an injunction initiated by
a consumer protection association must be brought before the courts where
the defendant is established or has its address. The CJEU held that this
37 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ 1993
L95/29.
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question is governed by the principle of procedural autonomy, subject to the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness. In line with the opinion of
Advocate-General Mengozzi, delivered on 5 September 2013, the CJEU did not
find any evidence for a breach of the principles of equivalence and effective-
ness by the Spanish rules, which confer territorial jurisdiction to the courts
where the defendant is established. The limited territorial remit and the
restricted financial situation of the consumer protection association in the
dispute at hand cannot prevail over the general interest in the sound admin-
istration of justice and foreseeability. On the basis of the different nature of
an action for an injunction and an individual action, the preferential proce-
dural treatment granted to individual consumers cannot be extended to
consumer protection associations.
– Right of consumer protection associations to intervene in enforcement pro-
ceedings: Opinion in case 470/12 Photovosť 12.12.2013 (CJEU): The Slovak
court raised the question whether Directive 93/13 and Articles 47 and 38 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union require or preclude
granting consumer protection associations leave to intervene in enforcement
proceedings. Advocate-General Wahl confirmed the admissibility of the pre-
liminary reference and concluded that the procedural rules of the Member
States are not required to grant consumer protection associations leave to
intervene into legal proceedings between an individual consumer and a seller
or supplier. However, in line with the minimum harmonization nature of
Directive 93/13, they are not precluded to grant this right to consumer protec-
tion associations.
Miscellaneous
– Purchase price reduction of a defective product where rescission of the
contract is excluded: Judgment in case 32/12 Duarte Hueros 03.10.2013
(CJEU): The CJEU held that where a consumer is entitled to a reduction of the
purchase price but claims only the rescission of the contract, which is,
however, excluded by the minor nature of the defect, and the consumer is not
entitled to refine his initial application or to initiate new legal proceedings to
that end, Directive 1999/44/EC38 precludes national legislation which does
not allow the national court to grant of its own motion an appropriate
38 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees,OJ 1999 L171/12.
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reduction of the purchase price. In the case at hand, the Spanish court
refused to rescind the contract of sale of a convertible car as it considered the
defect of a non-waterproof roof to be of minor nature. Spanish procedural law
precluded the award of a price reduction as the consumer did not, at least in
the alternative, request a price reduction in its application, and as the claim
could not be deferred to later proceedings under the principle of res judicata.
In line with the opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, delivered on 28 February
2013, the CJEU concluded that the Spanish procedural rules are in breach
with the principle of effectiveness as they deprive the consumer of the
possibility of benefitting from the right to seek an appropriate price reduction
pursuant to Article 3(5) of Directive 1999/44.
– Surcharging clause in contract between a mobile phone operator and its
customers: Opinion in case 616/11 T-Mobile Austria 24.10.2013 (CJEU): In the
case at hand, the Austrian Consumers’ Association initiated an action for an
injunction against the mobile phone operator, T-Mobile Austria. According to
the general terms and conditions of T-Mobile Austria, the customer has to pay
a surcharge if he decides to not pay by direct debit or credit card but instead
by a signed cash payment form or through online banking (telebanking). The
question arose whether Article 52(3) of Directive 2007/64/EC39 is applicable in
this context. Advocate General Wathelet affirmed that the provision is applic-
able to the contractual relationship between a mobile phone operator, as
payee, and that operator’s private customer (consumer), as payer. Moreover,
the notion of ‘payment instruments’ includes the credit transfer by a signed
cash payment form or through online banking. Finally, Advocate General
Wathelet concluded that the Austrian legislation, which prohibits a payee
from levying charges in general and from levying different charges for differ-
ent payment instruments in particular, is not precluded by Article 52(3) of
Directive 2007/64/EC.
39 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on
payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC
and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC,OJ 2007 L319/1.
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Competition Law, Public procurement and
State Regulation
– Concepts of ‘body governed by public law’ under Article 1(9), second subpar-
agraph, point (c) of Directive 2004/18/EC:40 Judgment in case 526/11 IVD
12.09.2013 (CJEU): The doctors’ association in Westphalia-Lippe initiated a
procedure for the award of a public contract for the printing and distribution
of its newsletter and the placement of advertising and the sale of subscrip-
tions. One of the candidates challenged the final award, claiming that the
successful tenderer had not submitted some of the references required by the
contracting authority. The national court decided of its own motion to make a
reference to the CJEU on the issue of the doctors’ association’s status as a
contracting authority, an issue on which the admissibility of the application
for review brought by the candidate depends. Although the doctors’ associa-
tion is mentioned in Annex III to Directive 2004/18, the CJEU clarified that the
inclusion of a body in that Annex is only the application of the substantive
rule laid down in Article 1(9), second subparagraph of Directive 2004/18,
which does not give rise to an irrebuttable presumption that that body is a
‘body governed by public law’within the meaning of that provision. The CJEU
held that although the national law determines the tasks of the doctors’
association and the manner in which the greater part of its financing must be
organised, and provides that the decision by which it fixes the amount of the
contributions payable by its members must be approved by a supervisory
authority, that body has in fact organisational and budgetary independence.
Therefore, it cannot be considered to be closely dependent on the public
authorities.
– Right of the contracting authority to ask candidates applying to take part in a
tendering procedure to provide copies of balance sheets: Judgment in case
336/12 Manova 10.10.2013 (CJEU): The Danish Education Ministry launched a
call for tenders in respect of services required for the operation of seven
occupational guidance and advice centres. During the preliminary screening
stage, the Ministry asked two candidates to forward a copy of their balance
sheets, as it was required in the contract notice. Upon complaint by one of the
candidates, the Complaints Board found a breach of the principle of equal
40 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and
public service contracts,OJ 2004 L134/114.
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treatment, since the Ministry did not reject the applications of the two
candidates, which failed to provide copies of their most recent balance sheets
at the same time as their applications for admission to the screening stage.
On the basis of its judgment in SAG ELV Slovensko and Others,41 the CJEU held
that the principle of equal treatment does not preclude a contracting author-
ity from asking a candidate, after the deadline for applying to take part in a
tendering procedure, to provide documents describing that candidate’s situa-
tion – such as a copy of its published balance sheet – which can be objec-
tively shown to pre-date that deadline, so long as it was not expressly laid
down in the contract documents that, unless such documents were provided,
the application would be rejected. That request must not unduly favour or
disadvantage the candidate or candidates to which it is addressed.
– Reliance on the capacities of more than one auxiliary undertaking to meet
tender requirements: Judgment in case 94/12 Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannoc-
chi Luigino 10.10.2013 (CJEU): The Provincia di Fermo initiated a tendering
procedure for a works contract for the modernisation and extension of a road.
Under that procedure, tenderers were required to demonstrate their technical
and professional ability by presenting an SOA certificate corresponding to
the nature and value of the works covered by the contract. One of the
candidates was excluded from the tendering procedure, as it relied on the
SOA certificates of two auxiliary undertakings. The CJEU held that Ar-
ticles 47(2) and 48(3) of Directive 2004/18/EC read in conjunction with Ar-
ticle 44(2) of that directive preclude a national provision which prohibits, as a
general rule, economic operators participating in a tendering procedure for a
public works contract from relying on the capacities of more than one under-
taking for the same qualification category. Directive 2004/18 permits the
combining of the capacities of more than one economic operator for the
purpose of satisfying the minimum capacity requirements set by the contract-
ing authority, provided that the candidate or tenderer relying on the capaci-
ties of one or more other entities proves to that authority that it will actually
have at its disposal the resources necessary for the execution of the contract.
If the special requirements of a work necessitate a certain capacity which
cannot be obtained by combining the capacities of more than one operator,
the contracting authority would be justified in requiring that the minimum
capacity level concerned be achieved by a single economic operator or, where
appropriate, by relying on a limited number of economic operators. However,
41 Case 599/10 SAG ELV Slovensko a.s. and Others v Úrad pre verejné obstarávanie 29.3.2012
(CJEU).
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since those circumstances constitute an exception, Directive 2004/18 pre-
cludes that requirement from being made a general rule under national law.
– Sale by a municipality of its cable network to a private undertaking; Contract
clause limiting the tariff for the basic service: Judgment in case 518/11 UPC
Nederland 07.11.2013 (CJEU): In this case, the municipality of Hilversum sold
its cable television network and the municipal undertaking which operated it
to UPC. Under their agreement, Hilversum undertook to assist the purchaser
in obtaining authorisation to install, maintain and operate a cable broad-
casting facility in the territory of the municipality. UPC undertook to make
the investments necessary for the provision of a cable network capable of
offering an improved service to average subscribers, and to offer, in addition
to radio and television channels, an attractive package of telecommunica-
tions services to private individuals and businesses. Additionally, the agree-
ment contained a clause that fixed the monthly tariff for the basic cable
package and allowed UPC to adjust that tariff only in line with the consumer
price index and ‘external cost increases’. In this context, UPC brought a legal
action seeking the annulment of the tariff limitation clause and an injunction
requiring the municipality to authorise the tariff increases. The CJEU deter-
mined on the basis of the different relevant directives, particularly the Frame-
work Directive,42 the Competition Directive43 and the Audiovisual Media
Services Directive,44 that a clear distinction has to be drawn between the
production of content, which involves editorial responsibility, and the trans-
mission of content, which does not entail any editorial responsibility. Both
content and transmission are covered by different measures which pursue
their own specific objectives. As UPC’s principal business is the transmission
of radio and television programmes via cable to its subscriber customers, its
service falls within the definition of an ‘electronic communications service’ in
Article 2(c) of the Framework Directive and, therefore, the substantive scope
of the NRF.45 Although UPC’s customers take out a subscription in order to
42 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework
Directive),OJ 2002 L108/33.
43 Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for
electronic communications networks and services,OJ 2002 L249/21.
44 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media
Services Directive),OJ 2010 L95/1.
45 ‘The new regulatory framework for electronic communications networks’ refers to the follow-
ing measures: Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March
European Union Litigation 145
gain access to the basic cable package offered by that company, UPC’s
business consists in broadcasting programmes produced by the content
editors by transmitting those programmes to the connection point of its cable
network in its subscribers’ homes. The fact that the transmission costs
charged to subscribers incorporate the payments made to broadcasting chan-
nels and the royalties paid to copyright collecting societies in connection with
the transmission of programme content cannot preclude this conclusion.
According to the NRF, it is the NRAs (national regulatory authorities) which
have power to define the relevant market for the purposes of the application
of the rules and instruments of regulatory intervention provided for by the
NRF. To that end, the NRAs are responsible for carrying out market analysis
and, in particular, where they find that undertakings have significant power
on that market, they may impose on them certain obligations, including tariff
obligations. However, Hilversum is not an NRA and therefore does not have
power to intervene directly in the retail tariffs in respect of services falling
within the NRF but can only request the NRA to adopt adequate measures.
Hilversum may also not rely on a clause stipulated in an agreement con-
cluded prior to the adoption of the new regulatory framework applicable to
electronic communications services which restricts that supplier’s freedom to
set tariffs.
– Transfer by public entities of their television provision activities and the
exclusive right to use their cable networks to an undertaking in the same
Member State: Judgment in case 221/12 Belgacom 14.11.2013 (CJEU): The dis-
pute at hand arose between Belgacom and four inter-municipal associations,
concerning various decisions by which they approved, without organising a
call for tenders, the conclusion of agreements providing for the transfer to
Telenet of its television broadcasting service activities and television sub-
scription contracts signed by their clients and, for a fixed period, ancillary
rights on their cable networks and the grant of long-term leasehold rights on
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services
(Framework Directive), OJ 2002 L108/33, Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 15 December 1997 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the telecommunications sector, OJ 1998 L24/1, Directive 2002/19/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic
communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive), OJ 2002 L108/7, Directive
2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation
of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive), OJ 2002 L108/21,
and Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on
universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services
(Universal Service Directive),OJ 2002 L108/51.
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those networks. The CJEU held that an agreement transferring to Telenet the
inter-municipal associations’ provision of television services and conferring
on it the exclusive right to operate their cable networks, constituted a service
concession within the meaning of Article 1(4) of Directive 2004/18. Even
though service concessions do not come within the scope of Directive 2004/
18 by virtue of Article 17, the public authorities which grant such a concession
are required to comply with the fundamental rules of the TFEU, since that
concession is of certain cross-border interest. Consequently, according to
Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU, an economic operator in a Member State may,
before the courts of that Member State, allege an infringement of the obliga-
tion of transparency occurring at the time of conclusion of an agreement
whereby one or more public entities of that Member State have either granted
to an economic operator of that same Member State a licence for services of
certain cross-border interest or granted an economic operator the exclusive
right to engage in an economic activity of cross-border interest. In case of a
lack of transparency, the cross-border interest is given, as economic operators
established in other Member States do not have a genuine opportunity to
manifest their interest in obtaining that concession. This amounts to a differ-
ence in treatment to the detriment of undertakings which might be interested
in that concession but which are located in other Member States. This indir-
ectly discriminatory treatment cannot be justified by the wish not to disregard
certain rights which the public entities have granted to the economic operator
under a pre-existing agreement concerning the use of cable networks belong-
ing to them, including when it is for the purpose of putting an end to a dispute
which has arisen as to the scope of that agreement. Grounds of an economic
nature, such as the wish to avoid the depreciation of an economic activity,
cannot be considered to be overriding reasons in the public interest.
– Negotiations on tenders which do not comply with the mandatory require-
ments of the technical specifications relating to the contract: Judgment in
case 561/12 Nordecon and Ramboll Eesti 05.12.2013 (CJEU): The Estonian High-
ways Office launched a negotiated procedure with the publication of a
contract notice for the planning and construction of a road section. The
Estonian Highway Office declared that the four tenders submitted were
admissible, even though the tender from one of the consortiums proposed a
different width of the central reservation than provided for in the contract
notice. During the negotiations which followed the submission of those
tenders, the Estonian Highways Office invited the other tenderers to alter the
width of the central reservation in their original tenders accordingly. The
CJEU held that Article 30(2) of Directive 2004/18 does not allow the contract-
ing authority to negotiate with tenderers that do not comply with the manda-
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tory requirements laid down in the technical specifications of the contract.
Even though the contracting authority has the power to negotiate in the
context of a negotiated procedure, it is still bound to see that the mandatory
requirements of the contract are complied with. This is necessary to ensure
compliance with the obligation of transparency, which is essentially intended
to preclude any risk of favouritism or arbitrariness on the part of the contract-
ing authority. Moreover, allowing a tender that does not comply with the
mandatory requirements to be admissible would deprive the fixing of manda-
tory conditions in the call for tenders of any useful effect and would not allow
the contracting authority to negotiate with the tenderers on a common basis,
enabling it to treat them equally.
– Possibility for a State authority to rely on certain provisions of Directive 93/
38/EEC46 against a body which is a public service concession in the case
where that directive has not been transposed into national law: Judgment in
case 425/12 Portgás 12.12.2013 (CJEU): Portgás is a limited liability company
governed by Portuguese law which is active in the natural gas production
and distribution sector. The dispute between Portgás and the Portuguese
Ministry concerns a decision ordering the recovery of financial assistance
which had been granted to that company in the context of the European
Regional Development Fund, on the ground that, at the time when it acquired
gas meters from another company, Portgás had not complied with a number
of rules of EU law applicable with respect to public contracts. Portgás claimed
that the Portuguese State could not require it, as a private undertaking, to
comply with the provisions of Directive 93/38, since that directive had not yet
been transposed into Portuguese law at the material time. The CJEU held that
Articles 4(1), 14(1)(c)(i) and 15 of Directive 93/38 cannot be relied on against a
private undertaking solely on the ground that, in its capacity as the exclusive
holder of a public-interest service concession, that undertaking comes within
the group of persons covered by Directive 93/38, in circumstances where that
directive has not yet been transposed into the domestic system of the Member
State concerned. However, the situation would be different if that under-
taking has been given responsibility, pursuant to a measure adopted by the
State, for providing, under the control of the State, a public-interest service
and has, for that purpose, special powers going beyond those which result
46 Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procurement procedures of
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, OJ 1993 L199/
84.
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from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals.47 Whether
this is the case in the dispute at hand has to be determined by the national
court. Assuming that Portgás can be regarded as an ‘emanation of the State’,
those provisions of Directive 93/38 could also be relied on against Portgás by
the Portuguese authorities.
– Certification body tasked with checking and certifying compliance by under-
takings carrying out public works: Judgment in case 327/12 Soa Nazionale
Costruttori 12.12.2013 (CJEU): The Italian legislature introduced, in accordance
with Article 52(1) of Directive 2004/18, a certification scheme to be carried out
by private bodies (SOAs). They are commercial undertakings entrusted with
supplying certification services, the receipt of an appropriate certificate being
a necessary condition in order for interested persons to participate in public
works contracts. The activities pursued by SOAs have an economic character
since the certificates are issued in return for remuneration and exclusively on
the basis of actual market demand. SOAs operate under conditions of compe-
tition. In this context, the CJEU ruled that Articles 101 TFEU, 102 TFEU and
106 TFEU do not preclude national legislation that imposes on SOAs a scheme
of compulsory minimum tariffs for certification services. However, the Italian
legislation is liable to make it less attractive for undertakings established in
Member States other than Italy to exercise the freedom of establishment on
the market for those services within the meaning of Article 49 TFEU. This
restriction can be justified in the sense that the setting of minimum tariffs for
the supply of such services is intended, in principle, to ensure the quality of
those services and it is suitable for attaining the objective of protecting the
recipients of those services by ensuring the independence of SOAs.
Employment law and Discrimination
– Inclusion in the minimum wage of elements of remuneration such as a lump
sum payment and a capital formation contribution: Judgment in case 522/12
47 See also: case 188/89A. Foster and others v British Gas plc [1990] ECR I-3313 (CJEU), paragraph
20; case 343/98 Renato Collino and Luisella Chiappero v Telecom Italia SpA [2000] ECR I-6659
(CJEU), paragraph 23; case 157/02 Rieser Internationale Transporte GmbH v Autobahnen- und
Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG (Asfinag) [2004] ECR I-1477 (CJEU), paragraph 24; case 356/05
Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, Minister for the Environment, Ireland, Attorney General and Motor
Insurers Bureau of Ireland (MIBI) [2007] ECR I-3067 (CJEU), paragraph 40; case 282/10 Maribel
Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la région Centre
24.01.2012 (CJEU), paragraph 39.
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Isbir 07.11.2013 (CJEU): Mr Isbir, employed in the industrial cleaning sector,
works in Germany for DB Services. He applied for the more favorable provi-
sions establishing the hourly wages of the building cleaning sector under
different collective wage agreements, which were made applicable to all
employees and employers of that sector, including those of DB Services.
Although DB Services did not dispute that it was subject to the collective
wage agreements, it considered that Mr Isbir had in fact already received
much more than the minimum hourly wage that he claimed, since he had
received, for the period in question and under the collective agreements
binding the Deutsche Bahn AG group, amounts which, according to it, should
be included in that minimum wage, namely two lump sum payments and the
contribution to the capital formation. The CJEU clarified that according to
Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71,48 the Member States are to ensure that, what-
ever the law applicable to the employment relationship, in the framework of
the transnational provision of services, undertakings guarantee workers
posted to their territory the terms and conditions of employment covering the
matters listed in that provision, inter alia the minimum rates of pay. To
determine the minimum rates of pay referred to in the first subparagraph of
Article 3(1), the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71 ex-
pressly refers to the national law or practice of the Member State to whose
territory the worker is posted. In the absence of any substantive definition of
the minimum wage, the task of defining what the constituent elements of the
minimum wage are therefore comes within the scope of the law of the
Member State concerned, in so far as that definition does not have the effect
of impeding the free movement of services between Member States. Accord-
ing to the ruling of the CJEU in Commission v Germany,49 only the elements of
remuneration which do not alter the relationship between the service pro-
vided by the worker, on the one hand, and the consideration that he receives
in return, on the other, can be taken into account in determining the mini-
mum wage within the meaning of Directive 96/71. While it is for the national
court to verify whether that is the case as regards the elements of remunera-
tion at hand, the CJEU held that the lump sum payments appear to be
consideration for the usual work of the workers, as provided for in a collective
agreement of universal application. On the other hand, since the aim of the
capital formation contribution appears to be an objective of social policy
48 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services,OJ 1997 L18/1.
49 Case 341/02 Commission vGermany [2005] ECR I-2733 (CJEU).
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supported by a financial contribution from the public authorities, it cannot
be regarded as forming part of the usual relationship between the work done
and the financial consideration for that work from the employer.
– Advancement of an employee of a local or regional authority to the next pay
step in his grade: Judgment in case 514/12 Zentralbetriebsrat der gemeinnützi-
gen Salzburger Landeskliniken Betriebs GmbH 05.12.2013 (CJEU): SALK is a
holding company for three hospitals and further establishments situated in
the Province of Salzburg. The defendant, Land Salzburg, is the sole share-
holder in SALK. Under Austrian law, SALK employees are regarded as offi-
cials or contractual agents of Land Salzburg. The Zentralbetriebsrat der
gemeinnützigen Salzburger Landeskliniken Betriebs GmbH sought a declara-
tion before court, that SALK employees have the right to have all periods of
relevant professional service completed in the European Union or the Eur-
opean Economic Area with employers other than Land Salzburg taken into
account in determining the reference date for the purposes of advancement
to the next pay step in their grade. As clarified by the referring court, if the
employee has only ever worked for Land Salzburg, full account is to be taken
of the entire period of service, but, if not, account is to be taken of only 60%
of the periods of service completed before recruitment by Land Salzburg.
Consequently, an employee who has worked for Land Salzburg from the very
beginning of his career will be placed on a higher pay step than an employee
who has accumulated comparable professional experience of equal length
with other employers. The CJEU held that Article 45 TFEU and Article 7(1) of
Regulation No 492/201150 preclude national legislation under which, in deter-
mining the reference date for the purposes of the advancement of an employ-
ee of a local or regional authority to the next pay step in his grade, account is
to be taken of all uninterrupted periods of service completed with that
authority, but of only a proportion of any other periods of service.
– Compensation for the unlawful insertion of a fixed-term clause in an employ-
ment contract: Judgment in case 361/12 Carratù 12.12.2013 (CJEU): In this case,
Ms Carratù brought legal proceedings against Poste Italiane as she consid-
ered that there were no lawful reasons for placing a time limit on her employ-
ment contract. The national court found the fixed-term clause to be unlawful
and held that an employment relationship of indefinite duration had com-
menced. The outstanding issue is the amount of compensation owed to Ms
Carratù. According to the Italian rules, the compensation payable for the
50 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on
freedom ofmovement for workers within the Union Text with EEA relevance,OJ 2011 L141/1.
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unlawful insertion of a fixed-term clause in a contract of employment is
limited to a bracket ranging from 2.5 to 12 months’ pay. If, instead, Ms Carratù
had been unlawfully dismissed under a contract of indefinite duration, she
would have had a right to a higher amount of compensation. The CJEU
clarified firstly that clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term
work51 must be interpreted as meaning that it may be relied on directly
against a State body such as Poste Italiane. Secondly, the concept of ‘employ-
ment conditions’ in that clause covers the compensation that the employer
must pay to an employee on account of the unlawful insertion of a fixed-term
clause into his employment contract. Thirdly, the CJEU held that the equal
treatment between workers with a fixed-term contract and comparable per-
manent workers, as laid down by clause 4(1) of the framework agreement,
does not apply to the dispute at hand. For the compensation paid in respect
of the unlawful insertion of a fixed-term clause into an employment relation-
ship to be determined in the same way as that paid in respect of the unlawful
termination of a permanent employment relationship, the persons concerned
must be regarded as being in a comparable situation. However, the situation
in which one of those types of compensation is paid is significantly different
from that in which the other is paid. The first type of compensation relates to
workers whose employment contract was concluded unlawfully, whereas the
second relates to employees who have been dismissed. Nevertheless, it is
apparent from a reading of clause 4(1) in conjunction with clause 8(1) that
they enable Member States that so wish to introduce more favourable provi-
sions for fixed-term workers and, therefore, to treat the economic conse-
quences of the unlawful insertion of a fixed-term clause into an employment
contract in the same way as those of the unlawful termination of an employ-
ment contract of indefinite duration.
Leave
– Right to receive maternity leave in case of surrogacy: Opinion in case 167/12
CD 26.09.2013 (CJEU): The situation at hand deals with the right to paid
maternity leave of an intended mother, who received her child with the
assistance of a surrogate mother and began mothering and breastfeeding the
51 Framework agreement on fixed-term work of 18 March 1999 (‘the framework agreement’),
which can be found in the Annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the
framework agreement on fixed-termwork concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP,OJ 1999 L175/43.
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child within an hour of the birth. Advocate-General Kokott clarifies that
Directive 92/85/EEC52 takes biological motherhood as the norm, since the
practice of surrogacy was not as widespread in the early 1990s as it is today.
However, in view of the possibilities created by medical advances, the objec-
tives pursued by Directive 92/85 must be understood in functional rather than
monistic biological terms. Maternity leave is intended to protect the special
relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows
pregnancy and childbirth, a position which is also consistent with Ar-
ticles 24(3) and 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. In the initial stage this relationship should not suffer from the mother
simultaneously pursuing employment. Consequently, according to Advocate-
General Kokott, an intended mother who has a baby through a surrogacy
arrangement has the right to receive maternity leave under Articles 2 and 8 of
Directive 92/85 where she takes the child into her care following birth. In this
regard, it is irrelevant whether the intended mother is breastfeeding the child
following birth. However, the right to maternity leave depends on the Member
State, in which rights under Directive 92/85 are being asserted, recognizing
the legal relationship of the intended mother and the child in the specific
case. The leave must amount to at least two weeks and any other maternity
leave taken by the surrogate mother must be deducted. Advocate-General
Kokott found no breach of Article 14 of Directive 2006/54/EC.53
– Right to receive paid leave of absence from employment equivalent to mater-
nity leave or adoption leave in case of surrogacy: Opinion in case 363/12 Z
26.09.2013 (CJEU): The case deals with the right to receive paid leave of
absence from employment equivalent to maternity leave or adoption leave of
an intended mother, who received her child through a surrogacy arrange-
ment, as she has no uterus and therefore cannot support a pregnancy.
Contrary to Advocate-General Kokott in CD, Advocate-General Wahl con-
cluded that a woman undertaking surrogacy cannot be compared to a woman
who, after being pregnant and having endured the physical and mental
constraints of pregnancy, gives birth to a child. Because of the clearly enun-
ciated objective of protecting the health and safety of workers in a vulnerable
condition, Directive 92/85 cannot be read as protecting a right to paid leave
52 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have
recently given birth or are breastfeeding,OJ 1992 L348/1.
53 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in
matters of employment and occupation,OJ 2006 L204/23.
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of absence equivalent to maternity leave in the case of a mother who has had
her genetic child through a surrogacy arrangement. Moreover, because the
different treatment of which the intended mother complains does not consti-
tute discrimination on grounds of sex, Directive 2006/54 cannot be construed
as precluding national legislation which does not provide for paid leave of
absence from employment, equivalent to maternity or adoption leave, for a
woman who is the genetic mother of a child born through a surrogacy
arrangement. A more appropriate point of comparison for a woman, who
becomes a mother through a surrogacy arrangement, would be an adoptive
mother. However, no provision is made under EU law which would entail an
obligation for Member States to grant paid leave of absence for adoptive
parents. Finally, Advocate-General Bot concluded that Directive 2000/78/
EC54 does not apply in circumstances in which a woman who suffers from a
condition that makes her unable to support a pregnancy and whose genetic
child has been born through a surrogacy arrangement is refused paid leave of
absence from employment equivalent to maternity leave and/or adoption
leave. The concept of ‘disability’ is to be understood in relation to the
possibilities for that person to work, and to exercise a professional activity.
The interrelationship between the limitation to support pregnancy and the
capacity to work appears to be missing in the circumstances at hand.
– Entitlement to payment of commission during annual leave: Opinion in
case 539/12 Lock 05.12.2013 (CJEU): In the situation at hand, the worker’s
annual pay comprises of basic pay and commission payments made under a
contractual right to commission. The commission is paid by reference to sales
made and contracts entered into by the employer in consequence of the
worker’s work. The worker receives the commission in arrears and the
amount in a given reference period fluctuates according to the value of sales
achieved and contracts entered into and the time of such sales. During the
period of annual leave, the worker is entitled to basic pay and continues to
receive commission payments based on commission earned earlier. However,
during the annual leave, the worker does not undertake any work that would
entitle him to commission payments and accordingly the average commission
earnings over the course of the year will be lower than they would be if the
worker had not taken leave. According to the opinion of Advocate-General
Bot, Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC55 requires such commission to be
54 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation,OJ 2000 L303/16.
55 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time,OJ 2003 L299/9.
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included in the basis for calculating the remuneration that is payable to that
worker in respect of his period of paid annual leave. Failure to take commis-
sion into account in the remuneration that is payable to a worker in respect of
his paid annual leave is capable of deterring him from exercising his right to
such leave. Advocate-General Bot left it to the national tribunal to determine
the method and rules enabling commission to be included in the basis for
calculating the remuneration that an employee must receive during his paid
annual leave. Taking into account the average amount of commission re-
ceived by the worker over a representative period, 12 months for example, ap-
pears to be an appropriate solution to Advocate-General Bot.
Discrimination
– Sex discrimination by different retirement age for men and women: Judgment
in case 614/11 Kuso 12.09.2013 (CJEU): Ms Kuso, who was born in 1948,
worked for her employer since 1967 under a permanent employment contract.
In 1980 she obtained status of ‘employee who cannot be dismissed’ and
agreed to be placed under a fixed-term employment contract governed by the
rules on employment and remuneration laid down in the Niederösterrei-
chische Landes-Landwirtschaftskammer (Dienst- und Besoldungsordnung
der Niederösterreichischen Landes-Landwirtschaftskammer). The termina-
tion of employment depends on the age of the employee and varies according
to whether the employee is a man (65 years) or a woman (60 years). In 2008,
the request of Ms Kuso for an extension of her contract beyond age 60 was
denied. The CJEU held that the national legislation under which the employ-
ment relationship is to come to an end upon attainment of the fixed retire-
ment age, which differs depending on whether the employee is a man or a
woman, constitutes direct discrimination prohibited by Article 3(1)(c) of
Directive 76/207/EEC.56 The applicability of the Directive to the termination of
the employment contract could not be ruled out by the fact that the contract
was concluded before the accession of Austria to the European Union.
– Right of the father to take part in the maternity leave: Judgment in case 5/12
Betriu Montull 19.09.2013 (CJEU): The preliminary reference concerns the
Spanish employment legislation according to which the first 6 weeks of
56 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and
promotion, andworking conditions,OJ 1976 L39/40.
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maternity leave following the birth must be taken by the child’s mother and
the mother may then elect for the father to take all or part of the remainder of
the maternity leave. Mr Betriu Montull applied for maternity benefit for the
period following the six weeks of compulsory leave which the mother must
take immediately following the birth. That application was rejected by the
Spanish National Social Security Agency on the grounds that the mother was
not a member of a State social security scheme and, therefore, had no primary
right to the leave and the social security cover. Moreover, it was submitted
that the father does not have his own individual, autonomous and indepen-
dent right to leave, but only a right derived from that of the mother. The CJEU
firstly clarified that while the Spanish legislation is in compliance with
Directive 92/85/EEC, the directive is not applicable to the situation at hand,
in which the mother is not an employed but self-employed person, who has
chosen not to be covered by a State social security scheme which guarantees
her such leave. With regard to Directive 76/207, the Spanish legislation
establishes a difference on grounds of sex as the right to maternity leave is
reserved to employed mothers, while the employed father is entitled to that
leave only on the condition that the mother confers on him all or part of the
available leave. However, the Spanish legislation intended to protect a wo-
man’s biological condition during and after pregnancy is justified by Article 2
(3) of Directive 76/207. In contrast, Advocate-General Wathelet concluded in
her opinion of 11 April 2013, on the basis of the judgments of the CJEU in Roca
Álvarez57 and Hofmann,58 that the 10 weeks’ leave in the present case is
accorded to workers solely in their capacity as parents of the child and is not
linked to the protection of the biological condition of the woman following
pregnancy or the protection of the special relationship between a mother and
her child.
– Increase of the contribution to the occupational pension scheme on the basis
of age: Judgment in case 476/11 HK Danmark 26.09.2013 (CJEU): The CJEU
held that an occupational pension scheme under which an employer pays, as
part of pay, pension contributions which increase with age complies with the
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age,59 provided that the differ-
ence in treatment is appropriate and necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.
This outcome corresponds with the opinion of Advcoate-General Kokott,
57 Case 104/09PedroManuel Roca Álvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA [2010] ECR I-08661 (CJEU).
58 Case 184/83Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse [1984] ECR 03047 (CJEU).
59 As enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and
given specific expression by Council Directive 2000/78/EC, and, in particular, Articles 2 and 6(1)
of that directive.
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delivered on 7 February 2013. The dispute at hand arose between two private
parties, Ms Kristensen and Experian, concerning alleged discrimination on
grounds of age. Experian has a mandatory occupational pension scheme,
which is not based on statute or a collective agreement, but on the employ-
ment contract entered into between Experian and its employee. The scheme
provides for Experian to pay two thirds of the contributions and the employee
to pay the remaining third. The amount of the contributions is determined by
a percentage of the basic salary and is graduated according to the age of the
employee. After clarifying that the contributions paid under the scheme fall
within the scope of Directive 2007/78/EC as they constitute an immediate
cash benefit within the meaning of ‘pay’ in Article 157(2) TFEU, the CJEU
found that the occupational pension scheme establishes a difference in treat-
ment based directly on the criterion of age. Even if the basic salary is equal,
the overall monthly pay, made up of the basic salary plus the employer’s
contributions, varies with the age of the employee. The difference in treat-
ment cannot be justified on the basis of Article 6(2) of Directive 2000/78,
because the disputed occupational pension scheme does not set any age for
admission to retirement benefits, given that Experian’s employees automati-
cally join the scheme after nine months’ service in the undertaking. However,
the difference in treatment on grounds of age is capable of being justified
under Article 6(1) of that directive. The occupational scheme reflects a legit-
imate aim as it enables all of Experian’s employees to build up reasonable
retirement savings, which they will have at their disposal when they retire
and cover the risks of death, incapacity and serious illness. The age-related
increases in contributions appear to be appropriate to the pursuit of those
aims. As a result of the application of higher pension contribution rates to
older workers, it is possible for those workers to build up a reasonable
retirement capital, even where their affiliation to the scheme is relatively
recent. Those increases also make it possible for younger workers to join that
scheme, while imposing on those persons a lighter financial burden. Addi-
tionally, the risks of death, incapacity and serious illness are statistically
more likely for older workers. However, it is for the national court to deter-
mine whether the age-related increases in contributions attain their aim in a
consistent and systematic manner, while ensuring that they do not go beyond
that which is necessary for achieving the aims pursued.
– Availability pay for civil servants, who have reached the age of retirement:
Judgment in case 546/11 Dansk Jurist- og Økonomforbund 26.09.2013 (CJEU):
The CJEU held that Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 preclude a
national provision under which a civil servant who has reached the age at
which he is able to receive a retirement pension is denied, solely for that
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reason, entitlement to availability pay intended for civil servants dismissed
on grounds of redundancy. In Denmark, civil servants who have been
dismissed on grounds of redundancy continue to receive their original
salary for three years. However, civil servants who have reached the age of
65 – and are therefore able, but are not obliged, to retire – have no
entitlement to that availability pay. The CJEU determined first whether the
alleged discriminatory national legislation falls within the scope of Directive
2000/78. The scope of the directive excludes social security or social protec-
tion schemes, the benefits of which are not equivalent to ‘pay’ within the
meaning of Article 157(2) TFEU. The availability pay is paid monthly for
three years by the State, acting in its capacity as a public employer, to a
civil servant dismissed on the ground that his post has ceased to exist. In
return for the entitlement to availability pay, the civil servant is obliged to
remain available to his employer during the period in which he receives that
pay and is obliged to take a suitable post offered by his employer. Conse-
quently, it represents immediate consideration in cash, paid by the employ-
er to the civil servant in respect of his employment, and thus constitutes
pay within the meaning of Article 157(2) TFEU. Given that the national
legislation at stake has the effect of depriving civil servants who have
reached the age of 65 of entitlement to availability pay, that provision
establishes a difference of treatment directly based on age within the mean-
ing of Article 2(2) of Directive 2000/78. Article 6(2) of Directive 2000/78 does
not justify the national legislation as it does not constitute an occupational
social security schemes covering the risks of old age and invalidity. While
the aim of the national legislation falls within the category of legitimate
employment policy and labour market objectives provided for in Article 6(1)
of Directive 2000/78, it goes beyond what is necessary. The measure
deprives civil servants who wish to remain in the labour market of the
entitlement to that pay merely because they could, because of their age,
draw a retirement pension, which could be lower than the pension to which
they would be entitled if they were to remain in employment for more years.
In order to avoid abuse by civil servants, it would be more proportionate to
examine individually whether the civil servants are actually available to
take up an alternative post. The result reached by the CJEU is in line with
the opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, delivered on 7 February 2013.
– Direct discrimination based on sexual orientation by a collective agreement
which restricts benefits to employees who marry: Judgment in case 267/12
Hay 12.12.2013 (CJEU): The CJEU held that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78/
EC precludes a provision in a collective agreement under which an employee
who concludes a civil solidarity pact (PACS) with a person of the same sex is
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not allowed to obtain the same benefits as those granted to employees on the
occasion of their marriage, where the national rules of the Member State do
not allow persons of the same sex to marry. In the dispute at hand, Mr Hay,
an employee of Crédit agricole, concluded a PACS with a person of the same
sex. On that occasion, Mr Hay applied for the days of special leave and the
marriage bonus granted to employees who marry, in accordance with Crédit
agricole’s national collective agreement. Crédit agricole refused him those
benefits on the ground that, under that collective agreement, they were
granted only upon marriage. The CJEU clarified that direct discrimination
occurs when a person is treated in a less favourable manner than another
person in a comparable situation. As regards benefits in terms of pay or
working conditions, such as days of special leave and a bonus granted at the
time of an employee’s marriage, persons of the same sex who cannot enter
into marriage and therefore conclude a PACS are in a situation which is
comparable to that of couples who marry. By relying on its case-law in
Römer60 and Maruko,61 the CJEU concluded that the restriction of benefits in
terms of conditions of pay or working conditions to married employees,
whereas marriage is legally possible in that Member State only between
persons of different sexes, give rise to direct discrimination based on sexual
orientation against homosexual employees in a PACS arrangement. A direct
discrimination can be only upheld on the grounds referred to in Article 2(5),
namely public security, the maintenance of public order and the prevention
of criminal offences, the protection of health and the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others, which have not been relied on in the dispute at hand.
Private International and
International Procedural Law
– Scope of the concept of ‘civil and commercial matter’ in Article 1(1) of Regula-
tion No 44/2001:62 Judgment in case 49/12 Sunico 12.09.2013 (CJEU): The CJEU
held that the concept of ‘civil and commercial matter’ covers an action where-
by a public authority of one Member State claims, as against natural and legal
60 Case 147/08 Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECR I-03591 (CJEU).
61 Case 267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I-01757
(CJEU).
62 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,OJ 2001 L012/1.
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persons resident in another Member State, damages for loss caused by a
tortious conspiracy to commit value added tax fraud in the first Member State.
In the dispute at hand, the UK tax authority brought court proceedings in the
UK against a number of natural and legal persons established in Denmark by
reason of the fact that the defendants allegedly took part in a tortious
conspiracy to defraud. More specifically, it was maintained that those non-
residents were guilty, on the territory of the UK, of a VAT ‘carousel’ type
fraud. The CJEU clarified that although certain actions between a public
authority and a person governed by private law may come within the scope of
Regulation No 44/2001, it is otherwise where the public authority is acting in
the exercise of its public powers. In the case at hand, the CJEU determined
that the legal relationship between the UK tax authority and the defendants is
not based on public law, involving the exercise of powers of a public author-
ity. This is due to the fact that the authority’s claim for damages is not based
on UK VAT law, but comes under the law of tort, and that the UK tax authority
does not exercise any exceptional powers in comparison with the rules
applicable to relationships between persons governed by private law. This
outcome is in line with the opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, delivered on
11 April 2013.
– Irreconcilable judgments given by courts of the same Member State: Judg-
ment in case 157/12 Salzgitter Mannesmann Handel 26.09.2013 (CJEU): In the
dispute at hand, Laminorul SA, a company established in Romania, brought
an action seeking payment for a delivery of steel products against Salzgitter
Mannesmann Handel GmbH before the Romanian courts. By its first judg-
ment, the Romanian court dismissed the action on the grounds that it was not
directed against the other party to the relevant contract. Laminorul initiated
new proceedings against Salzgitter before the same court, involving the same
cause of action. The application was served on Salzgitter’s former Romanian
legal representative, whose authority to act for that company had been
limited, according to Salzgitter, to the first proceedings. For this reason, no
one appeared on Salzgitter’s behalf at the hearing arranged by the Romanian
court, which proceeded to hand down a judgment by default against Salzgit-
ter, requiring Salzgitter to pay EUR 188,330. Salzgitter exhausted all legal
remedies available in Romania against this judgment. In the context of the
proceedings initiated in Germany for a declaration of enforceability of the
second judgment, the referring court notes that the first judgment, which
dismissed Laminorul’s action for payment, and the second judgment, which
upheld that action, are irreconcilable. Consequently, the question arose
whether a national court must decline to enforce a judgment given in another
Member State if it conflicts with a judicial decision from the latter Member
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State. In line with the principle of mutual trust, the CJEU concluded that 34(4)
of Regulation 44/2001 must be interpreted as not covering irreconcilable
judgments given by courts of the same Member State but only those given in
two different Member States. Otherwise, such a possibility of review as to the
substance would de facto constitute an additional means of redress against a
judgment which has become final in the Member Sate of origin. It is for the
party to the proceedings to avail himself of the legal remedies provided for by
the legal system in the Member State in which the proceedings take place.
The judgment is in accordance with the opinion of Advocate-General Wahl,
delivered on 16 May 2013.
– Applicable law in the absence of a choice made by the parties to an employ-
ment contract: Judgment in case 64/12 Schlecker 12.09.2013 (CJEU): In the
case at hand, Mrs Boedeker, a German national and resident, who pursued
her professional activity without interruption and exclusively in the Nether-
lands for more than 11 years, brought an action against her employer,
Schlecker, which is established in Germany, on the ground that the latter
unilaterally decided to change her place of work. In line with the opinion of
Advocate General Wahl (delivered on 16 April 2013), the CJEU held that
according to Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention,63 the national court may
disregard the law of the country where an employee carries out the work in
performance of the contract habitually, for a lengthy period and without
interruption, if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract
is more closely connected with another country. The national court must take
account of all the elements which define the employment relationship and
single out one or more as being, in its view, the most significant. In this
regard, account should be taken in particular of the country in which the
employee pays taxes on the income from his activity and the country in which
he is covered by a social security scheme and pension, sickness insurance
and invalidity schemes. In addition, the national court must also take ac-
count of all the circumstances of the case, such as the parameters relating to
salary determination and other working conditions.
– Application by a person who has been placed under guardianship for author-
isation to dispose of his immovable property: Judgment in case 386/12 Schnei-
der 03.10.2013 (CJEU): The case deals with non-contentious proceedings
brought by Mr Schneider, a Hungarian national who has been placed under
guardianship, for authorisation to sell his share of a property situated in
63 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, opened for signature in Rome on
19 June 1980,OJ 1980 L266/1.
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Bulgaria. Mr Scheider appealed the decision of the Bulgarian court, which
refused that application on the ground that disposal of the property in
question was not in the interests of a person declared to be lacking full legal
capacity. The CJEU concluded that the Regulation No 44/2001, particularly
Article 22(1), does not apply to non-contentious proceedings by which a
national of a Member State who has been declared to be lacking full legal
capacity and placed under guardianship in accordance with the law of that
State applies to a court in another Member State for authorisation to sell his
share of a property situated in that other Member State. The Court reached
this result due to the fact that the proceedings are concerned with the ‘legal
capacity of natural persons’ in Article 1(2)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001, which
falls outside the material scope of that regulation.
– Requirement of a ‘causal link’ under Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/
2001: Judgment in case 218/12 Emrek 17.10.2013 (CJEU): In the dispute at
hand, the consumer domiciled in Germany travelled to the business premises
of the seller in France in order to buy a second-hand car. By an action brought
before the German courts, he made claims against the seller under the
warranty. The German court referred to the CJEU the question, whether
Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001 requires the existence of a causal
link between the means used to direct the commercial or professional activity
to the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled, namely an Internet
site, and the conclusion of the contract with that consumer. The CJEU negated
the question but pointed out that a causal link must be regarded as constitut-
ing evidence of ‘directed activity’. In order to determine the existence of a
‘directed activity’ towards the Member State where the consumer is domi-
ciled, the national court has to make an overall assessment of the circum-
stances in which the consumer contract was concluded, taking also the non-
exhaustive list of criteria as established in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof64 and
Mühlleitner65 into account. Advocate-General Cruz Villalón reached the same
conclusion in his opinion, delivered on 18 July 2013.
– Concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’ under Regulation No 44/2001:
Judgment in case 519/12 OTP Bank 17.10.2013 (CJEU): In the case at hand, OTP
Bank, established in Hungary, has concluded with the debtor company, also
established in Hungary, contracts granting credit to the latter. Four years
later, over 75% of the capital of the debtor company was acquired by Hoch-
64 Joined cases 585/08 and 144/09 Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG and
Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH vOliver Heller [2010] ECR I-12527 (CJEU), paragraphs 89–91.
65 Case 190/11 Daniela Mühlleitner v Ahmad Yusufi and Wadat Yusufi 6.9.2012 (CJEU), paragraph
44.
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tief, established in Germany. Hochtief informed OTP Bank, but did comply
with the further reporting requirements under Hungarian company law. The
debtor company was subsequently subject to insolvency proceedings in
which it was not able to repay the debts owed to OTP Bank. The latter initiated
legal proceedings before the Hungarian courts to order Hochtief to repay the
debt of the debtor company. The CJEU held that an action based on national
legislation, which renders a person liable for the debts of a company which
he controls, where that person did not comply with the reporting obligations
following the acquisition of that company, cannot be regarded as concerning
‘matters relating to a contract’ for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation
No 44/2001.
– Applicable law to a commercial agency contract: Judgment in case 184/12
Unamar 17.10.2013 (CJEU): The legal proceedings between Unamar, a com-
pany incorporated in Belgium, and NMB, a company incorporated in Bulgar-
ia, concern the payment of various forms of compensation owed as a conse-
quence of the termination, by NMB, of the commercial agency contract which
until then had bound the two companies. The question was raised whether
the Belgian court could apply to the contract the law of the forum on the
ground of the mandatory nature of the rules governing the position of self-
employed commercial agents in the legal order of that Member State, despite
the contract expressly providing for the application of Bulgarian law, which
meets the minimum protection requirements laid down by Directive 86/653.66
On the basis of Articles 3 and 7(2) of the Rome Convention, the CJEU con-
firmed this question, provided that the court seized finds, on the basis of a
detailed assessment, that, in the course of the transposition of Directive 86/
653, the legislature of the State of the forum held it to be crucial to grant the
commercial agent protection going beyond that provided for by the directive,
taking account in that regard of the nature and of the objective of such
mandatory provisions.
– Concept of ‘other party to the contract’ in Article 16(1) of Regulation 44/2001:
Judgment in case 478/12Maletic 14.11.2013 (CJEU): In the dispute at hand, the
consumers domiciled in Bludesch (Austria) booked a package holiday on the
website of a travel agent established in Munich (Germany), while the trip was
to be operated by an Austrian company having its registered office in Vienna
(Austria). Because of a booking mistake, the consumers had to pay a sur-
charge upon arrival at the hotel. In order to recover the surcharge paid and to
66 Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the
Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents,OJ 1986 L382/17.
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be compensated for the inconvenience, they initiated an action before the
Bezirksgericht Bludenz seeking payment from the travel agent and the opera-
tor. The national court dismissed the action in as far as it was brought against
the operator on the ground that it lacked local jurisdiction. It held that
Regulation No 44/2001 was not applicable and that according to domestic
law, the courts in Vienna have jurisdiction. The CJEU held that the concept of
‘other party to the contract’ laid down in Article 16(1) of Regulation No 44/
2001 covers the contracting partner of the operator with which the consumer
concluded that contract and which has its registered office in the Member
State in which the consumer is domiciled. In line with the objectives of
Regulation 44/2001 to protect the consumer and to avoid concurrent proceed-
ings, the second contractual relationship cannot be classified as ‘purely’
domestic since it was inseparably linked to the first contractual relationship
which was made through the travel agency situated in another Member State.
– European Enforcement Order in a dispute between two persons not engaged
in commercial or professional activities: Judgment in Case 508/12 Vapenik
05.12.2013 (CJEU): The CJEU held that according to Article 6(1)(d) of Regula-
tion No 805/2004,67 the Regulation does not apply to contracts concluded
between two persons who are not engaged in commercial or professional
activities. The dispute at hand concerned the repayment of a loan based on
an agreement concluded between two parties none of whom was acting in a
professional capacity. The creditor obtained a judgment in his favor from the
Austrian courts and subsequently applied for a European Enforcement order
in order to facilitate its enforcement in Belgium, where the debtor lives. The
Austrian court refused, holding that one of the requirements for issuing such
an order against a ‘consumer’ is that the judgment has been given in the state
where he has his domicile. The CJEU clarified that there is no imbalance in a
contractual relationship between two persons not engaged in commercial or
professional activities. Therefore, that relationship cannot be subject to the
system of special protection applicable to consumers contracting with per-
sons engaged in commercial or professional activities.
– Jurisdiction to hear an action based on an exclusive distribution agreement:
Judgment in case 9/12 Corman-Collins 19.12.2013 (CJEU): In line with the
opinion of Advocate-General Jääskinen, delivered on 25 April 2013, the CJEU
held that a distribution agreement must be classified as a contract for the
supply of services for the purpose of applying the rule of jurisdiction in the
67 Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004
creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims,OJ 2004 L143/15.
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second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation No 44/2001. The characteristic
obligation of an exclusive distribution agreement would not correspond to
that of a ‘sale of goods’. Its general scheme is characterised by a framework
agreement, the aim of which is an undertaking for supply and provision
concluded for the future by two economic operators, including specific con-
tractual provisions regarding the distribution by the distributor of goods sold
by the grantor. An exclusive distribution agreement thereby fulfills the two
conditions of the concept of ‘service’, which is defined by the CJEU as requir-
ing that the party who provides the service carries out a particular activity in
return for remuneration. The first criterion of an ‘activity’ corresponds to the
service provided by the distributor, who, as a result of the supply guarantee,
is able to offer clients services and benefits that a mere reseller cannot and
thereby acquires, for the benefit of the grantor’s products, a larger share of
the local market. The second criterion of a ‘remuneration’ is constituted by all
the advantages that arise from the selection of the distributor by the grantor,
as the right to sell the grantor’s products in a particular territory and often-
times assistance regarding access to advertising, communicating know-how
by means of training or yet even payment facilities.
– Relationship between Regulation No 44/2001 and the CMR: Judgment in
case 452/12 NIPPONKOA Insurance Co. (Europe) 19.12.2013 (CJEU): In the case
at hand, Canon contracted with the Netherlands companies Nippon Neder-
land and Nippon Euro to transport by road several of its products between
the Netherlands and Germany. Nippon Euro contracted Inter-Zuid Transport
to carry out that transportation. Due to the fact that some of the consignment
was stolen, Canon received compensation from Nippon Euro by way of court
settlement. Subsequently, Nipponkoa Insurance brought an action for indem-
nity before the Second Commercial Chamber of the Landgericht Krefeld
against Inter-Zuid Transport. However, one year and a half prior to the
indemnity action, Inter-Zuid Transport had already obtained a final negative
declaratory judgment against Nippon Nederland and Nippon Euro in the
Netherlands in respect of the same facts, according to which Inter-Zuid
Transport was responsible for the damage suffered only up to the maximum
amount provided for in Article 23 of the CMR.68 Nipponkoa Insurance takes
the view that despite the existence of the negative declaratory judgment, the
Landgericht Krefeld has jurisdiction under Article 31(1) of the CMR to adjudi-
cate on the indemnity action as that article must be interpreted autonomously
68 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (‘CMR’), signed in
Geneva on 19 May 1956, as amended by the Protocol signed in Geneva on 5 July 1978.
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and prevails over Article 27 of Regulation No 44/2001, by virtue of Article 71
thereof. Inter-Zuid Transport claims that, under Article 27 of the regulation
and Article 31(2) of the CMR, the proceedings cannot be pursued before the
Landgericht Krefeld on account of the negative declaratory judgment given
previously in the Netherlands. By relying on its judgment in TNT Express
Nederland,69 the CJEU clarified firstly that according to Article 71 of Regula-
tion No 44/2001, an international convention may not be interpreted in a
manner which fails to ensure, under conditions at least as favourable as those
provided for by that regulation, that the underlying objectives and principles
of that regulation are observed. An interpretation of Article 31(2) of the CMR,
as meaning that that action for indemnity and the negative declaratory
judgment do not have the same cause of action, would not guarantee ob-
servance of the aim of minimising the risk of concurrent proceedings which is
one of the objectives and principles which underlie judicial cooperation in
civil and commercial matters in the European Union.
69 Case 533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV vAXAVersicherung AG [2010] ECR I-4107 (CJEU).
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